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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the wake of overwhelming discontent regarding cases on 
civilians’ rights and police immunities, it is now of paramount 
importance to examine the laws that influence these decisions.  
Peterson v. Kopp provides an epitomization of these laws.1  In 
Peterson, plaintiff Robert Peterson (“Peterson”) brought a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 action against defendants, the Metropolitan Council and officer 
Michael Kopp (“Kopp”), asserting that Kopp: (1) arrested him without 
probable cause; (2) arrested him in retaliation for exercising free 
speech; (3) used excessive force in his arrest; and (4) used excessive 
force in retaliation for exercising his right to free speech.2  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, holding that Peterson’s allegations of wrongful 
arrest, retaliatory arrest, and excessive force during the arrest were 
unwarranted under the doctrine.3  The court remanded Peterson’s 
retaliatory use of force claim for further examination.4  
 
 
                                                
 
1 Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2014) (upholding qualified immunity 
for a police officer accused of exercising excessive force and effectuating an arrest 
without probable cause).  
2 Id. at 596.  
3 Id. at 600-03.  
4 Id. at 603.  
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Near midnight on April 25, 2011, Peterson and a friend sat on 
four-foot tall bicycle lockers at a bus stop in St. Paul, Minnesota.5  
While waiting for a bus, three men “asked Peterson about the hookah 
pipe sticking out of his backpack.”6  Peterson, his friend, and the three 
men decided to smoke the hookah pipe together and take a later bus.7  
An on-duty police officer, Kopp, approached the group after seeing the 
interaction between Peterson, his friend, and the three men.8  After 
asking the group which buses they were waiting for and realizing that 
those buses had departed, Kopp ordered the group to disband.9  The 
majority of the group left, yet Peterson remained on the lockers as he 
disassembled his hookah pipe. 10  After most of the individuals 
departed, Kopp then argued with one of the individuals over whether 
he “was entitled to wait at a public bus stop.”11  The individual 
eventually left the scene after a “30-90 second[]” altercation.12  For the 
duration of this altercation, Peterson still remained on top of the 
lockers disassembling his hookah pipe, a process that Peterson 
reported took “approximately one minute.”13  
 While Peterson continued to disassemble his hookah pipe, he 
told Kopp that he was in the process of leaving and that Kopp did not 
“have to be rude.”14  Peterson then proceeded to ask the officer for his 
badge number as he pulled out his phone.15  Kopp refused to disclose 
any of the requested information to Peterson, retorting that Peterson 
had “no right to [his] badge number.”16  Peterson responded that he 
had the right.17  Kopp subsequently pulled Peterson from the bicycle 
lockers by grasping his arm.18  After being pulled from the lockers, 
Peterson “took a few steps backward, put his hands up, and said, 
‘[y]ou can’t handle me like that.’”19  Then, “Kopp pepper sprayed 
                                                
 
5 Id. at 596-97. 
6 Id. at 597.  
7 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 597.  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 597. 
14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 597.  
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Peterson . . . in the face.”20  When Peterson cried, “[p]olice brutality,” 
Kopp retorted, “[y]ou want to see police brutality?”21  Kopp “then 
pushed Peterson into the bicycle lockers, handcuffed him, and placed 
him in the back of the squad car.”22  
Resulting from the incident, Peterson faced “a citation for . . . 
trespass.”23  Furthermore, Peterson suffered from “pain, discomfort, 
and sensitivity to his face and eyes for 5–7 days after his arrest” and 
from apprehension of being in public for fear that a “painful 
experience . . . could happen at any point, anywhere.”24  After his 
charge was dismissed, Peterson sued Kopp and the Metropolitan 
Council for violating the First and Fourth Amendment, alleging 
wrongful arrest, retaliatory arrest, excessive force in the arrest, and 
excessive force in retaliation for exercising freedom of speech.25  
 
III.  RATIONALE 
Peterson alleged that Kopp violated his First and Fourth 
Amendment rights for wrongful arrest, retaliatory arrest, excessive 
force in the arrest, and excessive force out of retaliation for exercising 
his freedom of speech.26  The Eighth Circuit held that the doctrine of 
qualified immunity justified the majority of Kopp’s actions during the 
altercation with Peterson; however, the Eighth Circuit remanded 
Peterson’s retaliatory force claim to the district court.27  The Eighth 
Circuit held that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded 
government officials from liability “unless the official’s conduct 
violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which 
a reasonable official would have known.”28  The doctrine of qualified 
immunity breaks down into a two-step test.29  In determining if Kopp 
was entitled to qualified immunity for all of Peterson’s allegations, the 
court evaluated: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . 
make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right 
at issue was clearly established at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged 
                                                
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 597.  
26 Id. at 596. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 598 (quoting Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011)).  
29 Id.  
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misconduct.”30  
Using the qualified immunity analysis, the Eighth Circuit first 
addressed Peterson’s allegation of unlawful arrest.31  Peterson argued 
that the arrest was unlawful because Kopp did not have probable 
cause.32  On the contrary, the court held that Kopp had probable cause 
for Peterson’s arrest.33  The Eighth Circuit determined that “when the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest are sufficient to 
lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has committed 
or is committing an offense,” the officer has probable cause and is thus 
shielded by qualified immunity.34  Furthermore, an officer only needs 
“arguable probable cause” to gain the protection of qualified 
immunity.35  Arguable probable cause exists when an officer 
mistakenly believes that a suspect’s actions constitute adequate 
probable cause for an arrest, given that the suspicion for probable 
cause is reasonable.36  
The Eighth Circuit determined that Kopp had arguable 
probable cause to arrest Peterson for violating state law and 
demonstrating resistance to complying with Kopp’s orders.37  The 
Eighth Circuit determined that Peterson violated Minnesota’s trespass 
law by “refus[ing] to depart from the premises on demand of the 
lawful possessor.”38  Furthermore, although Peterson averred that he 
was not disobeying orders and was simply disassembling his hookah 
pipe, the Eighth Circuit found otherwise, determining that Peterson’s 
nonverbal conduct amounted to disobedience.39  Peterson’s actions of 
disassembling his hookah pipe, stopping the disassembly process to 
use his cell phone, and asking for Kopp’s badge number—all while 
remaining on the lockers—constituted arguable probable cause.40  
Peterson rebutted the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion, stating that he was 
arrested for asking for Kopp’s badge number, a request protected by 
the First Amendment.41  However, the court held that even if Kopp 
arrested Peterson for demonstrating his First Amendment right to free 
                                                
 
30 Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
31 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 598.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (quoting Ulrich v. Pope Cnty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (quoting Ulrich, 715 F.3d at 1059).  
37 Peterson, 754 F.3d. at 598-99. 
38 Id. at 598 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(3)(2014)). 
39 Id. at 599.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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speech, the other valid reasons for arrest—such as Peterson’s 
disobedience and violation of Minnesota law—supersede the First 
Amendment violation.42 
The Eighth Circuit then addressed Peterson’s excessive force 
claim.43  During his arrest, Peterson contended that Kopp used 
excessive force, thus violating Peterson’s Fourth Amendment right “to 
be free from unreasonable seizures.”44  In determining whether Kopp 
used excessive force in Peterson’s arrest, the court used an “objective 
reasonableness” test.45  The Eighth Circuit explained that this test took 
into account that an officer’s actions “must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight.”46  In determining whether an officer’s 
actions in pursuing an arrest were reasonable, the Eighth Circuit 
evaluated “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses 
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether 
[the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.”47  The court concluded that Peterson’s purported crime was not 
severe, he was not posing a threat to others, nor was he fleeing.48  As 
Peterson’s disobedience was passive and non-threatening to others, 
Kopp’s infliction of physical force onto Peterson was deemed 
excessive.49  
While Kopp’s arrest failed the excessive force test, the Eighth 
Circuit held that Kopp was entitled to qualified immunity because 
Peterson’s injuries sustained from the altercation with Kopp were de 
minimis.50  The injuries were de minimis because Peterson “did not 
seek medical care and his injuries resolved themselves without 
medical intervention.”51  To support its conclusion, the court provided 
a wealth of similar cases for comparison.52  The court further noted 
that a recent decision changed the law regarding the applicability of 
qualified immunity for de minimis injuries; however, the court also 
                                                
 
42 Id. 
43 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 599. 
44 Id. at 600. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).  
47 Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. 386 at 396).  
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 601. 
51 Id.  
52 Compare Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding pepper spray 
injuries de minimis when symptoms subsided within forty-five minutes), with 
Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding pepper spray 
injuries more than de minimis when effects lingered for years afterwards). 
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clarified that it rendered the ruling after the altercation between Kopp 
and Peterson.53  Therefore, Kopp was reasonable in assuming that, as 
long as the injuries he inflicted upon Peterson were de minimis, he 
would remain entitled to qualified immunity as his actions were 
“constitutionally permissible” at the time.54  
Lastly, the Eighth Circuit addressed Peterson’s two retaliation 
claims.55  Peterson alleged that Kopp both pepper sprayed and arrested 
him for participating in a constitutionally protected activity.56  In 
determining whether Kopp acted in retaliation, the court determined 
that Peterson must show that “he engaged in a protected activity,” that 
“the government official took adverse action against him that would 
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity,” 
and that “the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the 
exercise of the protected activity.”57  The Eighth Circuit consolidated 
the three prongs of the test by stating that a plaintiff need only show 
that “he was ‘singled out because of [his] exercise of constitutional 
rights’” in order to prevail on a retaliation claim.58  The court further 
implemented a fourth prong to this traditional test.59  To satisfy the 
test, Peterson would also need to prove a “lack of probable cause or [a 
lack of] arguable probable cause.”60  
The Eighth Circuit first applied the aforementioned test to 
Peterson’s claim of retaliatory arrest.61  In applying this four-prong 
test, the Eighth Circuit held that “Kopp [was] entitled to qualified 
immunity on Peterson’s retaliatory arrest claim because, as detailed 
above, Kopp had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest,” as 
exemplified through his actions prior to his arrest.62  
The Eighth Circuit then evaluated Peterson’s claim of being 
pepper sprayed out of retaliation.63  The court determined that Peterson 
presented enough evidence to prove that Kopp pepper sprayed him out 
                                                
 
53 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 601.  The court noted that, at the time of the altercation 
between Peterson and Kopp, “it was ‘an open question in [the Eighth Circuit] 
whether an excessive force claim require[d] some minimum level of injury.’”  Id. 
(citing Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2011)).  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 601-02.  
56 Id. at 602. 
57 Id. (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)).   
58 Id. (quoting Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 481 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
59 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602.  
60 Id. (referring to Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 602-03.  
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of retaliation. 64  In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that it was significant to Peterson’s contention that, shortly before 
being pepper sprayed, Peterson demanded Kopp’s badge number.65 
This—along with Kopp’s outright refusal to provide Peterson with the 
requested information—justified the court’s decision to remand the 
issue.66  The court ultimately held that “[a] reasonable jury could 
conclude . . . that Kopp pepper sprayed Peterson in retaliation for 
asking for his badge number, and Peterson’s First Amendment right 
was clearly established at the time of the incident.”67  For these 
reasons, the Eighth Circuit remanded the retaliatory force claim for 
further review.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Despite its arrival during a tumultuous era for civilian rights, 
Peterson does not stray from the majority of its precedents regarding 
the evaluation of qualified immunity.  Peterson’s claims of wrongful 
arrest, retaliatory arrest, and excessive force all proved futile under the 
Eighth Circuit’s application of qualified immunity, while Peterson’s 
claim of retaliatory force has been remanded for further examination.  
It is clear from the holdings in Peterson that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity still reigns supreme in cases of purported police brutality.  
Unless there is a reevaluation of the doctrine on a fundamental and 
moral level, Peterson will provide precedent for further police 
brutality cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
64 Id. at 603.  
65 Peterson, 754 F.3d at 603. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
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